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CASE COMMENTS

of available physicians from which to select is small (because the
expert is required to be from the same locality as the defendant), make
it very difficult, if not impossible, for the plaintiff to find an expert
witness.
The problem, however resolved, demonstrates convincingly the
real desirability of having experts appointed by the court to make
independent examinations and to render written reports to the court.
Every modem effort has been directed toward this goal,2 0 but the
courts have not adopted this practice. The next most desirable approach would appear to be that adopted in Dark v. Fetzer., If a
physician is innocent of any malpractice, his testimony will certainly
aid him and make out his own case; if not, justice will be better served
when the physician is forced to develop the plaintiff's case for him.
EDWIN

A.

GENDRON, JR.

RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION AS A STANDARD
OF PER SE ILLEGALITY UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
Since the end of the Second World War, franchising has become the
fastest growing form of product distribution in the United States.1
There are presently 33o,ooo franchisees with total sales of $65 billion
each year, one-tenth of the Gross National ,Product.2 Surveys indicate that at least 83 percent of these franchise agreements incorporate
wThe Model Code of Evidence and the Model Expert Testimony Act call for

experts recommended by the parties but appointed by the court. This procedure
would eliminate partisanship and allow the experts to examine the problem situation out of court and later express their conclusions in a written report. It would
eliminate the hurried, confused, and often misunderstood conclusions arrived at
under the pressures of examination and cross-examination at the trial. If one
party was dissatisfied with the report of the appointed expert, he would have
the right to call his own expert. The court would also preserve the privilege of
calling the appointed expert to the stand to qualify or explain any questionable
portions of his report.
Here there is also the advantage of preservation of the adversary system and
retention of the jury as the final decision-making body. There would also be
a solution to the hang-up of pre-trial testimony. Because of the rule that one
party is not allowed to cross-examine a paid expert at the pre-trial investigation
(because of the unfair expense to the other party) there is a question whether the
defendant-doctor may be cross-examined in that capacity. If there were a court
appointed expert this problem would no longer exist and the result would be a
saving of time, energy, and expense.
2E. GREmaFa, MARKETING AND PUBLIC POLICY 85 (1966).
2

Handler, Statement Before the Small Business Administration, ii ANTrRusr
BULL. 417, 418 (1966).
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3
vertical restrictions imposed by the franchisor upon the franchisee.
The legality of customer and territorial restrictions under the antitrust
law was recently decided by the Supreme Court, for the first time, in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company.4
Schwinn sells through a nationwide franchise system and imposed territorial and customer restrictions upon its franchised distributors. These restrictions required the distributors to resell
Schwinn's line of bicycles and bicycle parts only in certain geographical
areas and only to franchised retailers. Other restrictions required the
retailers to sell only to the general public and not to non-franchised
retailers.
Schwinn employed three separate distribution arrangements; territorial and customer restrictions were common to all three. Under the
first arrangement Schwinn products were sold to the distributor, with
title to the products passing to him. The second type was a consignment arrangement where the title remained in Schwinn and the distributor acted as an agent, taking the order from the franchised retailer
and delivering the bicycles to him. The third distribution arrangement
was the so-called "Schwinn Plan" whereby Schwinn retained title
and placed the bicycles directly on the retailers showroom floor,
receiving payment when the bicycles were sold.
The Supreme Court held that where title passed to the distributor
the restrictions on resale customers were illegal per se. In so holding
the Court found that these restrictions were a restraint upon alienation,
were implemented by agreement, and therefore, were so obviously
destructive of competition that their mere existence was sufficient to
constitute a violation of section i of the Sherman Act.5 The Court
went on to point out that these restrictions were identical in effect
to the territorial restrictions found illegal per se by the district court. 6
The Court refused to hold that the same territorial and resale customer restrictions were illegal per se when Schwinn retained title to
the products as in the second and third distribution arrangements, but
held that the legality of such arrangements was subject to the rule of
reason. Upon examination of competition in the bicycle market, the
Court found that the restrictions were not unreasonable where Schwinn
retained title, dominion, and risk.
The Supreme Court first considered vertically imposed restrictions
3
J. CURRY, PARTNERS FOR PROFITS, A STUDY OF FRANCHISING 51
4388 U.S. 365 (1967).

(1966).

515 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
OSchwinn did not appeal the district court's holding that the territorial restrictions, after passage of title, were per se illegal.
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on territory and resale customers in White Motor Company v. United
States.7 White Motor limited the territory in which its dealers and
wholesalers could sell and the customers to whom they could sell
within those territories. The case was before the Supreme Court on
appeal from a summary judgment holding the restrictions to be illegal
per se. In returning the case for a jury determination the Court said:
"This is the first case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical
arrangement; and we know too little of the actual impact of both
that restriction and the one respecting customers to reach a conclusion
on the bare bones of the documentary evidence before us." 8 And
later in the opinion the Court added: "We do not know enough of
the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements
emerge to be certain." 9
The lower courts took this language in the White Motor opinion
as conclusive of the inapplicability of per se standards to vertical territorial and customer restrictions. Relying on White Motor, the circuit
court in Snap-On Tools Corporationv. FTC, 0 after a thorough examination of all factors, held that territorial and customer restrictions
were reasonable. Sandura Company v. FTC" reached the same conclusion on similar facts pointing out that the restrictions on territory
increased interbrand competition. Thus, prior to Schwinn it seemed
settled that vertically imposed territorial and customer restrictions
2
were not per se illegal.'
The Supreme Court in deciding Schwinn did not follow the SnapOn Tools and Sandura interpretation of the White Motor decision,
but instead based its decision of per se illegality on the principle that
agreements which restrain alienation of chattels are illegal as restraints
of trade. Although never before used in the area of vertical territorial and customer restrictions, this concept was used as part of the
rationale to find vertical price fixing restrictions illegal per se when
imposed by a seller after passage of title to the buyer.'3
'372
US. 253 (1963).
8
1d. at 261.
9
d. at 263.
10321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
11339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
"aWhite Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market .Division, 75 YALE L.J.
373 (1966); Averill, Antitrust Considerations of the Principle Distribution Restrictions in Franchise Agreements, 15 Am. U.L. REV. 28 (1965); Restricted Channels
of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARi. L. REv. 795 (ig6i)."3Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Northern Pac. R.R. v. United
States, 356 US. 1 (1958); United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926);
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This principle was expounded in John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman,14 where attempts were made on the part of a manufacturer to
enforce price fixing which had been imposed on the original vendee.
The original vendee had purchased medicines from the manufacturer
and in turn sold them to the defendant who was selling them at a
discounted price to the public. In holding the agreement between the
manufacturer and the original vendee void and as such unenforcible,
the Court said: "The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general property in movables, and restraints upon
alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public
policy ....- 15

The doctrine was further amplified in DT'. Miles Medical Company
v. John D. Park & Sons.16 Dr. Miles produced medicines and transferred them to so-called agents who in turn passed them on to retailers. The agreements provided for minimum prices and required
the wholesale agents to sell only to approved retailers. The Court
held that the agencies were not valid since the goods were actually
bought for resale. The Court then applied the rule of Hartman invalidating agreements which restrain alienation and held that the
defendant could not be enjoined from selling at prices below those
17
specified by the plaintiff.

Both Hartman and Dr. Miles were suits to enforce private agreements which included provisions restraining alienation. The courts in
both cases pointed out that the contracts in question were void also
because they were unreasonable restraints of trade and thus violated
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.

30o

(1919); Boston Store v. American

Graphophone Co., 246 U:S. 8 (1918); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Garst v. Hall & Lyon Co., 179 Mass. 588, 61 N.E. 219 (191o).
1153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).

"Id. at 39.
16220 U.S. 373 (1911).

' 7Successful attempts were made in cases such as United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300 (1919), to show that where there was, in fact, no formal agreement to
support price fixing restrictions, there was no restraint upon alienation and thus no
per se illegality. Colgate merely suggested prices and would refuse to supply goods
in the future if these prices were not followed. Since an agreement is essential to
an action under section s of the Sheman Act, the absence of such an agreement
being alleged resulted in the Court holding that Colgate was not restraining
trade. Three years later the Court clarified its position on the necessity of a formal
agreement in FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). In

considering

another price fixing situation the Court in Beech-Nut made it clear that the
necessary agreement might be implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances. The Court went on to find that there was an implied agreement and
that the price fixing agreement restrained alienation and therefore was a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, following the rationale of the Dr. Miles case.
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section i of the Sherman Act. It was in these early private contract
cases that the courts equated restraints upon alienation, when implemented by agreement, with unreasonable restraints on trade under the
Sherman Act. The rationale for the equation of the two principles
was best expressed in Dr. Miles where the Court pointed-out that
when title to goods has passed to the distributor accompanied by restraints upon alienation, such as price fixing, only the various distributors can benefit from the price fixing agreements, since the manufacturer had received his fair price before he passed title. The Court
concluded that the effects are identical to horizontal price fixing and
thus illegal as unreasonable restraints on trade. 18
Subsequent to the Dr. Miles decision, the Court in United States
v. General Electric Company19 reiterated the importance of the location
of title and the inherent rights of the holder of title to impose
restrictions upon his agents. "The owner of an article ... is not violating the common law, or the Anti-Trust law, by seeking to dispose
of his article directly to the consumer and fixing the price by which
20
his agents transfer the title from him directly to such consumer."
Thirty-one years after Dr. Miles the Supreme Court began -to
modify the strict title-passage distinction set down in that case and
followed in General Electric. When the Court considered vertical
21
price fixing restrictions in United States v. Masonite Corporation,
it recognized a valid agency relationship between Masonite and its
distributors. The Court, however, found that the agents were potential
or actual competitors of Masonite and, therefore, held that the restrictions were unreasonable restraints of trade, even though effected
through a valid agency without passage of title.
An analysis of Dr. Miles and Masonite indicates that if title has
passed to the distributor, vertical price fixing is per se illegal and,
likewise, if title has not passed, the arrangements still could be found
illegal upon application of the rule of reason. The significance of the
location of title, and the related restraints upon alienation, had
evolved through these two decisions into a line of separation between
the application or non-application of per se illegality.
Schwinn did not follow the rationale of the earlier vertical restriction cases. The Court found the necessary passage of title but refused
to find vertical territorial and customer restrictions identical to hori-

U.S. at 408.
U.S. 476 (1926).
OId. at 488.
6
'31 U.S. 265 (1942).

1 2o

"272
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zontal divisions of markets, long recognized as illegal per se.2 2 In
omitting this final step, the Court has given new significance to the
location of title and restraints upon alienation as applied to antitrust cases. This property doctrine of restraints upon alienation has
become, as a result of Schwinn, a standard of per se illegality in its
own right.
It would seem that the results of Schwinn would be the same regardless of whether the Dr. Miles rationale or the pure property right
argument were followed. However, the question of whether modern
antitrust decisions should be based on ancient property law principles,
rather than on economic analysis, still remains to be answered.
WILIAm P.

BOARDMAN

SALES TAX IMPLICATIONS OF RETAILER'S
PURCHASE OF PREMIUM MERCHANDISE FOR
TRADING STAMP REDEMPTION
The typical sales and use tax statute exempts items purchased for
the purpose of resale.' The most common purchase for resale occurs
when a retail merchant purchases goods from a wholesaler for subsequent sale to his customers. The customer becomes the taxable
purchaser of the goods, while the liability for the collection and payment of taxes rests with the retailer. 2 When a retailer purchases premium merchandise for the express purpose of redeeming the merchandise
for trading stamps which he has issued, a question arises whether the
retailer's purchase of the premium merchandise is exempt from taxation as a purchase for resale.
In Colonial Stores, Incorporated v. Undercofler3 a retailer issued
trading stamps to its customers with their purchase of its retail product
line. The trading stamps were redeemable for premium merchandise
which the retailer had purchased. The retailer paid a sales and use
tax on its purchase of the premium merchandise and the customer
paid a sales and use tax on his retail purchases. The retailer petitioned
2'U,nited States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 31o U.S. 150 (1940); Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
'CAL. REV. 9- TAX CODE § 6007 (West 1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.02 (1958);
GA. CODE ANN. § 92-34o3a(C) (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.3 (1965).
2CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6052 (West 1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.o6 (1958);
GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3402a (ig6i).
3223 Ga. 1o5, 153 S.E.2d 549 (1967).
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for a refund of the sales tax collected on its purchase of premium
merchandise. The Georgia Court of Appeals denied the petition
holding that the purchase of the premium merchandise was a cost of
doing business and that the premium merchandise was not purchased
for resale. 4 On appeal the supreme court held that the premium
merchandise was sold to the customers, hence Colonial's purchase of
the premium merchandise was a purchase for resale 5 and not taxable
under the Georgia Retailers' and Consumers' Sales and Use Tax Act.6
The court reasoned that there was a sale of the premium merchandise to the customer because consideration was present in the
transaction. It was shown that the redemptive value of the stamps was
equal to the cost of the premium merchandise and that the cost was
reflected in the prices of the retailer's product line, therefore the
customer paid for the premium merchandise. In addition, the court
noted that the customer also paid the sales tax on the premium
merchandise because he paid a sales tax on his retail purchase and
such purchase included the sales price of the premium merchandise.
The court summarily rejected arguments that there was no consideration for the transaction because no separate charge was made for
the stamps, and that consideration was lacking because there was no
reduction in the purchase price if the customers refused or did not
7
receive the stamps.
The dissent in Colonial concluded that the premium merchandise
was a gift from the retailer rather than a sale to the customer. The
dissent observed that profits belong exclusively to the operator of a
business and that an operator has a right to expend these funds for
promotional activities, such as giving customers free gifts.8
'Undercofler v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 114 Ga. App. 466, 151 S.E.2d 794 (1966).
"Colonial is the first case that has litigated the issue of whether a retailer's
purchase of premium merchandise is a sale for resale. State Tax Comm'n v. Consuiners Market, Inc., 87 Ariz. 376, 361 P.2d 654 (196o), involved a similar fact situation, however this issue was not discussed as it was stipulated by the parties that
merchandise was purchased for resale.
6GA. CODF ANN. ch. 9 2-3 4A (1961).
7The court stated that these contentions were not meritorious in light of
Underofler v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 221 Ga. 824, 147 S.E.2d 436 (1966). In
Eastern the court was concerned with whether meals served to passengers were
a sale for resale. The cost of the meals was included but not separately stated in
the price of a passenger's ticket and the cost of the ticket remained the same regardless of whether the meals were taken. The court reasoned that the sale of the
food was complete when the ticket was purchased. The fact that the cost of the
meal was included in the price of the ticket did not prohibit the sale of the meal
as the cost was a known amount and hence separable from the charge made for
the transportation.
OThe dissent contended that the majority could not identify the price of the
stamps even though -the price was included in the sales price of the retailer's pro-
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To determine whether the retailer's purchase of premium merchandise was a purchase for resale and therefore not a taxable transaction, the Supreme Court of Georgia looked to the transaction between the retailer and his customer to determine if there had been
a "sale." The Georgia Sales and Use Tax Act defines a sale as "any
transfer of title or possession or both.., in any manner or by any
means whatsoever of tangible property for a consideration ....9 The
court stated that the stamps represented a right to the premium
merchandise and treated the premium merchandise, rather than the
stamps, as the object of the sale. 10 To find that there was a statutory
sale of the merchandise to the retail customer there must be (i) a
transfer of title or possession and (2) consideration.
The court in Colonial did not discuss the transfer of title" to
the premium merchandise. Apparently the court considered the receipt
of the stamps by the customer to be the transfer necessary to satisfy
the statutory requirement of a transfer of title or possession of the
duce. Moreover, the sales price included not only expenses but also profits of the
retailer. The retailer may utilize these profits, as the profits are his property, by
purchasing promotional items such as stamps or premium merchandise. The dissent also noted there would be administrative difficulties if the court's decision were
followed. This point was exemplified in a hypothetical question posed by the
dissent, "[I]f with a sale of fertilizer that is exempt from the sales tax, ioo stamps
are delivered, as in this case, then how can the sales tax for the stamps that are
not exempt be collected?" 153 S.E.2d at 553. The dissent concluded that if the
majority opinion were followed the delivery of the stamps must be taxed, but the
tax could not be collected with the sale of the exempt item. 153 S.E.2d at 553.
9GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3403(a) (B) (Supp. 1965). For similar statutory definitions
of a sale see CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6oo6 (West 1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.02
(1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § io5-164.3 (1965); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.01 (1965); VA.
CODE ANN. § 58-441.2 (1966).
"The question of whether stamps are the object of the sale in a two-party
transaction has never been litigated. Nevertheless, it would appear that the stamp
holder under a two-party plan holds a right similar to that of a stamp holder in a
three-party stamp transaction. Under the three-party transaction the customer
becomes a third party beneficiary to the contract between the retailer and the
trading stamp company. Rance v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 410 P.2d 859, 868 (Okla.
1965); Hornof v. Kroger CO., 35 Ill. 2d 125, 219 N.E.2d 512 (1966). There appears
to be no reason why stamps in a two-party transaction should not have characteristics similar to their three-party counterparts. Thus the Colonial court was correct in not discussing the stamps as objects of the sale because they represent
rights to premium merchandise and could merely be considered a convenient accounting method to aid customers in recording the value of their right to the
merchandise.
"Questions of title transfer have generally arisen where a state has attempted
to establish jurisdiction to tax a sale. Rite Tile Co. v. State, 278 Ala. soo, 176 So. 2d
31 (965); Ham v. Continental Gin Co., 276 Ala. 611, 165 SO. 2d 392 (1964); Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, i Ariz. App. 302, 402 P.2d 423 (1965);
Santa Clara Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 225 Cal. App. 2d 676, 37
Cal. Rptr. 5o6 (1964).
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premium merchandise. However, this position appears untenable. The
customer, stampholder, only receives a value of merchandise as represented by the stamp; he does not receive the merchandise itself. It is
generally recognized that title to goods does not pass until the goods
are ascertainable, 12 as ownership in goods is not created unless the
goods are in existence and can be identified by the terms of the
bargain.13 Before redemption, the premium merchandise necessarily
remains a mass of property composed of units of varying quality, size,
and value; consequently, there must be a selection of the merchandise
in order to execute the sale. 14 The transfer of possession and identification of the premium merchandise occurs only upon selection of
the merchandise when the stamps are redeemed. Thus, it would
appear that there could be no completed taxable sale until the
merchandise is selected at redemption. 15
Consideration, the second statutory requirement for a sale, was
found in the fact that the cost of the premium merchandise was included in the price charged for the store's retail items. 6 However,
7
other courts have refused to find consideration solely on this basis.'
Indeed, another Georcia court previously recognized that all costs of
a business operation are reflected in the prices charged and the fact
that this cost is included in the general charge is not sufficient to
constitute a sale of an item used in the promotion of its business.' 8
Although inclusion of the cost of an item in the price of general goods
alone may not be sufficient to constitute consideration, if the portion
2'GA. CODE ANN. §

1ogA-2-401(1)

(1962); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401(l)

(1958 version); Chatam v. Clark's Food Fair, Inc., io6 Ga. App. 648, 127 S.E.2d
868 (1962); 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES §258 (rev. ed. 1958).
"GA. CODE ANN. § iogA-2-5ol(I) (1962); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-501(1)
(1958 version); 2 S. WILISTON, SALES § 258 (rev. ed. 1948).
"4See GA. CODE ANN. § IogrA-2-40I(2) (1962); 'UNIFORM COaIEMECIAL CODE §
2-401(2) (1958 version); Chatham v. Clark's Food Fair, Inc., 1o6 Ga. App. 648, 127
S.E.2d 868 (1962); Albany Mill Supply Co. v. United Roofing & Mfg. Co., 12 Ga. App.
537, 77 S.E. 829 (1913); Annot., 1o6 A.L.R. 1284 (1937).
"Colonial did not discuss the identity issue, although it is arguable that the
issue could have been dismissed summarily and the sale justified on the basis
of an implied consent for future delivery which was recognized in Undercofler v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 221 Ga. 824, 147 S.E.2d 436, 443 (1966). However, Colonial
is distinguishable as the premium merchandise must be selected and delivered to
the stamp holder, rather than simply delivered as was the situation with the meals.
'"Accord, McCarroll v. Scott Paper Box Co., 195 Ark. 1105, 115 S.W.2d 839
(1938); Belleville Dr. Pepper v. Korshak, 36 Ill. 2d 352, 221 N.E.2d 635 (1966).
7
Undercofler v. Macon Linen Serv., Inc., 114 Ga. App. 231, 150 S.E.2d 703
(1966); San-A-Pure Dairy Co. v. Bowers, 173 Ohio St. 469, 183 N.E.2d 918 (1962);
Commonwealth v. Benjamin Franklin Hotel Co., 77 Dauph. 14, 28 Pa. D.&C.2d
329 (1961).
"sUndercofler v. Macon Linen Serv., Inc., 114 Ga. App. 231, 150 S.E.2d 703 (1966).
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of the price attributable to the cost of the item is known and
separable, 19 or if the customer realizes that he is paying directly for
the item, 20 consideration can be found. However, it is doubtful that
there was consideration for the premium merchandise in Colonial
21
under either of these tests.
Even if the transaction between the retailer and his customer
satisfies the statutory requirements for a sale of the premium merchandise, it is not necessarily a taxable transaction. The Georgia
statute levies a sales tax on the purchase in a retail sale, which is
"[a] sale to a consumer or to any person for any purpose other than
for resale .... ',22 Colonial failed to analyze the original transactionthe sale of the premium merchandise to the retailer-in terms of the
complete statutory definition of a "retail sale," which identifies the
consumer as the taxable party. Thus, the question presented is whether
the retailer or his customer is the consumer of the premium merchandise exchanged for the stamps.
In determining who is the consumer and therefore the taxable
party, the basic area of inquiry is whether the item is merely incidental
to the objective of the business and therefore consumed by the business,
or whether the sale of the item is the object of the business and therefore consumed by the customer.
The application of the "incidental to the business" test is illustrated
by retail sales cases involving the question of whether a customer
purchases the wrappings, packages, and containers used to hold the
retailer's product line when he makes his retail purchase. Where paper
bags and twine are used by the retailer for the purpose of delivering
articles to the customer, the retailer is the taxable consumer of the
packaging. 23 In reaching this conclusion an Arkansas court reasoned
that "the retail merchants were engaged in selling merchandise and
as an incident to their business.., to entice trade, and as a matter of
convenience for the customers, used and consumed [the paper bags and
'Undercofler v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 221 Ga. 824, 147 S.E.2d 436 (1966).
2°Morton Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. MacFarland, 212 Tenn. 168, 368 S.W.2d 756
(1963).
"As a practical matter it would be difficult to isolate the price of the merchandise since only a small percentage of each retail price reflects the cost of the
merchandise. Moreover, it is probable that the customer has no knowledge that
he is paying for the merchandise.
2GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3403(a)(C) (Supp. 1965) (emphasis added). It should be
noted that a definition of "resale" is not given in the statute.
"Dermott Grocery & Comm'n Co. v. Hardin, 203 Ark. 446, 156 S.W.2d 882
(1941); Wiseman v. Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, 192 Ark. 313, 90 S.W.2d 987

(1936); see Colgate-Palmolive-Peet CO. v. Joseph, 308 N.Y. 333, 125 ,N.E.2d 857 (1955).
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twine] in their business .... "24 However, where a retailer purchases
a product already packaged, such as a box of biscuits, and resells this
product in its original form to its customer, the packaging is considered to be a natural and integral part of the sale; the customer is
the taxable consumer of the packaging.25 It does not appear that
premium merchandise is a natural and integral part of any sale of
the retailer's product line as the customer's receipt of premium
merchandise is not necessarily present in any retail sale. It is apparent
that premium merchandise, like paper bags, entice trade for the
retailer, and this fact indicates that the premium merchandise is incidental to the retailer's business.
In applying the "incidental to the business" test to professional
service situations courts have examined the nature of the service in
relation to the item in question. If an item is employed in reaching
the objective of the professional service, such as a physician's utilization
of dressings to effect the cure of a patient, the professional man is the
consumer of the item as it is incidental to his business. 20 Obviously
the physician is not in the business of selling medical dressings. It
would follow that an enterprise such as a stamp plan must be incidental to the business itself as the retailer is in the business of buying and
selling produce, not premium merchandise.
Another professional service case utilized a different approach by
examining the use of the items in -question rather than relying on the
nature of the professional practice to determine the consumer. Where
a dentist purchased dentures from a manufacturer and transferred
them to his patients, the court held that the patients who used the
dentures as they were intended to be used were the consumers of the
nfDermott Grocery & Comm'n Co. v. Hardin, 203 Ark. 446, 156 S.W.2d 882,
883-84 (1941).

zMcCarroll v. Scott Paper Box Co., 195 Ark. 11o5, 115 S.W.2d 839 (1938).
See Moore v. Arizona Box Co., 59 Ariz. 262, 126 P.2d 305 (1942); American

Mo-

lasses Co. v. McGoldrick, 281 N.Y. 269, 22 N.E.2d g69 (1939); Paper Prods. Co. v.
City of Pittsburgh, 183 Pa. Super. 234, 13o A.2d 219 (1957), afJ'd, 391 Pa. 87, 137
A.2d 253, 256 (1958).
20Babcock v. Nudelman, 267 Ill. 626, 12 NE.2d 635 (1937); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 8o5 (1965);
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 38o N.Y. 100, 123 NXE.2d 792 (1954); AxelrodBeacon Dental Laboratory v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D.&.C. 19o (Phila. County Ct. 1938).
Contra, Commonwealth v. Miller, 337 Pa. 246, 11 A.2d 141 (194o). In Miller it
was shown that an optometrist who orders and sells glasses to his patients was
not engaging in a business at all necessary to his professional service and
consequently was a retail vendor of the glasses. In Axelrod it was shown
that a dentist's purchase of dentures was incidental to his professional services
and consequently there was no resale of the dentures to the patients.
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dentures. 27 The court defined use as the continued possession and
employment of the item as it was intended to be used. This approach
appears to support Colonial's holding as the retailer's customers will
actually use the premium merchandise for the purpose for which
it was manufactured.
However, in a non-professional service situation, while demonstrating that a guest actually uses a hotel room's furnishings such as a
television set as part of his rented room, the court stated that a hotel
owner uses the furnishings by making the room liveable and rentable.
The court held that the furnishings were incidental to the hotel's
business and as such constituted a business expense. 28 Thus, the owner
is the consumer of the furnishings. As applied to the premium merchandise it is apparent that both the retailer and the customer actually
use the merchandise. The retailer uses it for its intended promotional
effect, while the customer actually uses it after stamp redemption
occurs. Applying the rationale of the hotel case it would appear that
the retailer is the consumer of the premium merchandise.
The foregoing discussion has examined the "incidental to the business" test in cases which are analogous to Colonial but which do not
deal specifically with promotional items. Nevertheless, the sales tax
implications of the purchase of promotional items have been tested
under a unique Ohio statute which exempts items used "directly in
making retail sales."' 29 It has been held that advertising booklets, signs,
and promotional items fall within the statutory exemption. 30 The
issue of whether promotional items are taxable has not been raised
in other jurisdictions apparently because promotional items have generally been considered a business expense. Courts have reasoned that
the one who benefits from the promotional value of an item is the
'Berry-Kofron Dental Laboratory Co. v. Smith, 345 Mo. 922, 137 S.W.2d 452
(1940). Contra, Axelrod-Beacon Dental Laboratory v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D.&C.
19o (Phila. County Ct. 1938).
"Atlanta Americana Motor Motel Corp. v. Undercofler, 222 Ga. 295, 149 S.E.2d
691 (1966); accord, Hotels Statler Co. v. District of Columbia, 199 F.2d 172 (D.C.
Cir. 1952); Sine v. State Tax Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 214, 390 P.2d 13o (1964).

-9OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5 7 3 9 .o1(E) (Baldwin 1964). In Warren Tel. Co. v.
Bowers, 173 Ohio St. 164, 18o N.E.2d 595 (1962), the court in applying the statute
held that for materials to be exempted from the tax, the item must be essential to
the rendering of the service of the business, rather than merely essential to the
operation of the business. Warren held the purchase of goods relating primarily
to the administrative aspect of the company, such as billing and providing employees facilities were subject to the tax.
"'Standard Oil Co. v. Donahue, lo Ohio St. 2d 134, 226 N.E.2d 758 (1967); White
Castle Systems, Inc. v. Bowers, 172 Ohio St. 141, 174 N.E.2d 1o8 (1961).
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consumer of that item. 31 This strongly suggests that the premium
merchandise was consumed by Colonial as it was used in the promo32
tion of its retail business.
The consumer test appears to be the most realistic approach to
determine sales tax liability on the purchase of a promotional item
for use in a retail business. Colonial employed a technical analysis of
a sale in order to meet the statutory resale exemption requirement
and consequently did not consider the nature of the premium merchandise and its relation to the retailer's business. Using the technical
analysis the same conclusions could be reached for any item purchased by a retailer and used in the operation of his business. The
consumer test considers the nature and business effects of the item
itself and consequently leads to a more realistic interpretation of the
sales tax act. It is hoped that the Colonial decision is not indicative of
the direction other courts will take in applying sales tax statutes to
strictly promotional items.
The retailer freely acquired the financial burden of the premium
merchandise and it is the retailer who receives the benefit from offering the promotional device. According to Colonial a customer purchases the promotional items which are used to encourage his patronage of the store. This being the case, perhaps the customer should
at least be notified that he is taking part in the sale of the premium
merchandise and thereby have the opportunity to decline the sale.
DAVID

D.

REDMOND

AN ATTORNEY IN POSSESSION OF EVIDENCE
INCRIMINATING HIS CLIENT
One of the most difficult dilemmas facing an attorney is determining where his duty lies with respect to evidence incriminating his
client. Often this evidence has been revealed to the attorney on the
strictest basis of secrecy, and he frequently must decide if it is his
duty to reveal such evidence to the court, of which he is an officer.
The Oath of Admission to the American Bar Association requires an
attorney not only never to "seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any
nUndercofler v. Macon Linen Serv., Inc., 114 Ga. App. 231, 150 S.E.2d 703
(1966); Long Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 264 N.C. 12, 140 S.E.2d 744 (1965); San-A-Pure
Dairy Co. v. Bowers, 173 Ohio St. 469, 183 N.E.2d 918 (1962).
'1The majority in Colonial acknowledged that the objective of the trading
stamp scheme was sales promotion. 153 S.E.2d at 551.
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artifice or false statement," but also to "maintain the confidence and
preserve inviolate the secrets of [his] client."'
In In re Ryder, 2 attorney Richard R. Ryder voluntarily took possession of stolen money and a sawed-off shotgun which had been
secreted in a safe-deposit box by his client, who was about to be charged with bank robbery. Before and immediately after transferring the
incriminating evidence to an adjacent safe-deposit box rented under
his own name, Ryder consulted with several prominent members of
his local bar association about the propriety of his actions. By retaining possession of the money and gun, Ryder intended to invoke
the attorney-client privilege regarding confidential communications
and thereby prevent use of the evidence in establishing his client's
guilt. When the FBI discovered the evidence in Ryder's safe-deposit
box and informed the court, Ryder was suspended from practice until
further order. The matter then was referred to the United States
Attorney, who was requested to file charges within five days. In the
proceeding to determine whether Ryder should be removed from the
roll of attorneys qualified to practice before the federal district court,
the court decided that, in light of mitigating circumstances, 3 Ryder's
conduct warranted eighteen months' suspension from practice before
the court. 4 In its denunciation of Ryder's actions, the court treated
the question as involving a breach of professional conduct.
Ryder's action is not justified because he thought he was
acting in the best interests of his client. To allow the individual
lawyer's belief to determine the standards of professional conduct will in time reduce the ethics of the profession to the
practices of the most unscrupulous. Moreover, Ryder knew that
the law against concealing stolen property and the law forbidding receipt and possession of a sawed-off shotgun contain
no exemption for a lawyer who takes possession with the intent
of protecting a criminal from the consequences of his crime. 5
Although the court did not say what Ryder should have done
with the incriminating evidence, it nevertheless strongly denounced
his concealment of the money and gun as being beyond the limits of
Oath of Admission to the Bar, American Bar Association.
1381 F.2d 713 ( 4 th Cir. 1967)
3"There is much to be said, however, for mitigation of the discipline to be
imposed. Ryder intended to return the bank's money after his client was tried. He
consulted reputable persons before and after he placed the property in his lockbox,
although he did not precisely follow their advice." In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360,
370 (E.D. Va. 1967). It is unlikely that the court felt that Ryder deserved special
consideration because he was an attorney seeking to aid his client.
'In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 36o (EiD. Va. 1967).
'Id. at 369.
2Recommended
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ethical conduct imposed by Canons 15 and 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. 6
On appeal, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed Ryder's suspension and denounced his actions
in stronger terms than did the lower court.
It is an abuse of a lawyer's professional responsibility knowingly to take possession of and secrete the fruits and instrumentalities of a crime. Ryder's acts bear no reasonable relation
to the privilege and duty to refuse to divulge a client's confidential communication. Ryder made himself an active participant in a criminal act, ostensibly wearing the mantle of a loyal
advocate, but in reality serving as accessory after the fact.7
Although one would suspect that many criminal lawyers would be
forced to make ethical decisons about the handling of incriminating
evidence and thus would be placed in a situation similar to Ryder's
there is little direct precedent for the Ryder case.8 The Canons of Professional Ethics, 9 as well as the reports of the American Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics, provide ethical guidelines
for the attorney, but neither of these really confronts the precise
dilemma in Ryder. Attempts to reconcile the attorney's duties usually
produce a general discussion of the attorney-client privilege and relationship, 10 an analysis of whether the attorney's actions are crimiaCanons 1-82 of the Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted by the American Bar Association at its Thirty-First Annual Meeting on August 27, 19o8. Canon
15 states in part, "[1]t is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of
the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law.
The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of -him for any
client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his
own conscience and not that of his client." Canon 32 states in part, "No client,
corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive nor should any lawyer render any service
or advice involving disloyalty to the law whose minsters we are, or disrespect of
the judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or
persons exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of the
public. When rendering any such improper service or advice, the lawyer invites
and merits stern and just condemnation."
7381 F.2d at 714-

"The courts only recently have begun to recognize a lawyer's dual role in relation to incriminating evidence. In a case involving the propriety of the lawyer's
revelation of such evidence received from his client, the court recognized two
competing policies of law, each demanding conflicting duties from the attorney.
In re Selser, 15 N.J. 898, 1o5 A.2d 895 (1954).
9
At present the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards is undertaking to write "a more modern, improved and correct
restatement, in usable form, of the lawyer's professional responsibilities in the
light of the present structure and development of the profession." 58 A.B.A.J.
902 (1967).
"See, e.g., Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339 (1953)-
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nal," or, perhaps, a look at the lawyer's social and professional obligation to preserve justice.' 2 Those few authorities directed to the problem
tend to produce conflicting conclusions or superficial analyses with
each of these approaches.
Ryder argued that the attorney-client privilege required him not
to reveal the incriminating evidence and also allowed him actively to
conceal the stolen money and sawed-off shotgun. As applied to incriminating evidence, the attorney-client privilege has been justified
on the social theory that "preservation of the confidence will create
a general social benefit of greater value than would the disclosure of
the truth in special instances."' 2 The Committee on Professional
Ethics has suggested that an attorney should refuse to comply with
a court's order to reveal privileged communications even though the
court might order him to jail for such refusal. 14 It certainly can be
argued that to require Ryder to produce the incriminating evidenceindeed, to make it his duty to do so-is practically the same as requiring him to be an advocate both for the defense and for the prosecution. In deciding a case where an attorney learned that his client did
not meet the residence requirements for a pending divorce suit and
asked whether this information should be revealed to the court, the
Committee on Professional Ethics answered that although a lawyer
has a duty to expose any fraud about to be practiced on the courts,
nevertheless in this situation "this duty does not transcend that to
preserve the client's confidences."' B The Committee's opinion logically
could be extended to make the duty of secrecy expected and required
of an attorney paramount to any duty to reveal incriminating evidence.
The client is presumed innocent, and it seems inconsistent with this
premise that the lawyer could be required in a criminal case to present
evidence of guilt while at the same time asserting innocence.
It also would seem inconsistent to find the attorney "disloyal" to
the court because he asserted the attorney-client privilege in regard to
incriminating evidence. Loyalty to the courts certainly should not be
isolated from loyalty to the entire concept of criminal rights in our
judicial system. The criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to
"State v. Johns, 209 La. 244, 24 So. 2d 462 (1946) .
12See, e.g., ARA CoMaM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS,
13E. MORGAN,

No. 91 (1933).
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 114 (1953). It has been suggested

that protection of the individual's rights may at times be paramount to the public
interest. State ex r'el. Sowers v. Oiwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964).
"ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, Informal Opinion No. 312.
25ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, NO. 268 (1945).
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effective assistance of counsel, 16 and no professional or ethical responsibility can exist which interferes with this constitutional standard for the administration of justice. Indeed, in an opinion deciding
that an attorney was not required to reveal to the court that his client
had committed perjury in an earlier divorce proceeding, the Committee on Professional Ethics has been explicit.
We yield to none in our insistence on the lawyer's loyalty to
the court of which he is an officer. Such loyalty does not, however, consist merely in respect for the judicial office and candor
and frankness to the judge. It involves also the steadfast maintenance of the principles which the courts themselves have
evolved for the effective administration of justice ....
17
Some courts have not followed this logic. In Clark v. State,'8 where
the attorney had advised his client to dispose of the murder weapon,
a Texas court disagreed with the Committee opinion. Although the
court only ruled on the admissibility of the testimony of a telephone
operator who had overheard the lawyer advise the client to dispose
of the murder weapon, it nevertheless condemned the attorney's
action. The court concluded that the general rule that the attorneyclient privilege should not be used to protect one who seeks to commit
a crime should apply to anyone who, "having committed a crime,
seeks or takes counsel as to how he shall escape arrest and punishment, such as advice regarding the destruction or disposition of the
murder weapon or the body following a murder."'19
Clark seems to follow the theory that the attorney, as an oath-bound
servant to the administration of justice, owes his first duty to the
court and that the duty owed to the client's cause is subordinate to
that owed society and justice. 20 However, it certainly could be argued
that in many situations the attorney who zealously protects the individual defendant's rights and privileges is by his actions serving the
highest interests of society and justice.21 Such a view has been adopted
"Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); People v. Ibarra, 6o Cal. 2d
460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).

27ABA
"159

COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS,

Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339 (1953) .

No. 287 (1953).

"Id. at 347. However, the Supreme Court has suggested that the attorneyclient privilege could be invoked as to information revealed to the attorney for
the purpose of "devising a scheme to escape the consequences of [the client's]
crime." Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 360 (1891).
"0One court has even gone so far as to suggest that when in such cases lawyers
fail to live up to this high ethical standard imposed by the demands of justice,
"they injure themselves, wrong their brothers at the bar, bring reproach upon an
honorable profession, betray the courts, and defeat justice...." In re Kelly, 243 F.
696, 705 (D. Mont. 1917).
"Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956).
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in more general terms by the Model Code of Evidence, which submits that "[t]he social good derived from the proper performance of
the functions of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to outweigh the harm that may come from the suppression of evidence in
22
specific cases."
The Model Code appears to be in conflict with Canon 22, which
states that a lawyer's conduct with the court should be characterized
by "candor and fairness." 23 The Committee on Professional Ethics has
said that a lawyer should not "endeavor in any way, directly or indirectly, to prevent the truth from being presented to the court in
the event litigation arises."'2 4 Although not involving criminal prosecutions or confronting the exact situation posed in Ryder, several courts
have followed the reasoning of Canon 22 and this Committee opinion.
In a case where the attorney advised his client to destroy a list made
by the decedent concerning the distribution of the decedent's property, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a lawyer who wilfully
either destroys or suppresses evidence which may be required at any
legal proceeding is guilty of a breach of professional duty and should
be disciplined for such action. 25 It has been suggested that the court
relies on counsel to inform it of all the facts and that because of this
reliance the court will not tolerate the deliberate withholding of
facts, 26 nor will it permit an attorney to "bide his time and decide himself when the disclosure should be made." 27 However, while stating
general principles, these decisions do not squarely confront the prob22

MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 210, Comment (1942).
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 22.
'ABA CONIMI. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 131 (1935). In Meek v.
Fleming, [1961] 2 Q.B. 366, where a police officer was sued for false imprisonment,
the court held that the .plaintiff was entitled to a new trial after defendant's counsel
had concealed the fact that the defendant had been reduced in rank after he had
tried to deceive the court in another case.
Both the bench and bar impose a strong duty upon those lawyers engaged in
public prosecution not to conceal or suppress evidence which would aid the
defendant in his defense. Canon 5 states that the prosecutor's primary duty is to
justice rather than to conviction, and it has been suggested that the "suppression
of facts or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
accused is highly reprehensible." (Canon 5). Thus, where a public prosecutor
suppressed evidence of the adulterous conduct of the defendant's wife on the night
the defendant killed her, Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957), or of the drunken
state of a defendant charged with murder, United States ex rel. Thompson v.
Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955), courts have awarded new trials to the defendants.
'In re Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.W.2d 4 (1946).
2
Harkin v. Brundage, 13 F.2d 617 ( 7 th Cir. 1926), revld on other grounds, 276
U.S. 36 (1928).
'In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 322 P.2d 1o95, io98 (1958).

'ABA
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lem posed by Ryder. They imply that an attorney by fulfilling his
obligation to respect his client's confidences and communications,
could be guilty of suppressing evidence. However, the Committee on
Professional Ethics, apparently in agreement with the Model Code of
Evidence, has submitted in a long and well-reasoned opinion that the
duty of candor and fairness imposed upon the lawyer by Canon 22
is "not sufficient to override the purpose, policy and express obligation" imposed by the canons supporting the attorney-client privilege. 28
It is not clear whether Ryder's failure was the result of his violation
of some special duty peculiar to attorneys or whether he simply violated the general prohibition imposed on every citizen against possession of stolen property and illegal shotguns. It has been argued
that an attorney who invokes the attorney-client privilege with respect
to incriminating evidence is in effect guilty of the crime of destroying
evidence.29 The federal district court was quick to point out in Ryder
that Ryder's actions were illegal.3 0 It would be a logical assumption
that any other person who acted as Ryder did would clearly be guilty
of a criminal offense. Ryder was not criminally prosecuted, however,
but was charged with a violation of Canons 15 and 32. The court in
Ryder did not confront the more difficult question of how far an
attorney's ethics may properly depart from the ethical standards
imposed upon a citizen not of the legal profession. 31 It has been held
that the fact that it is an attorney and not an ordinary citizen who
2ABA CoM.

ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS, NO. 287 (1953). The Com-

mittee referred specifically to Canon 37. There was a rare dissent to this opinion.
Although the Committee did not discuss whether its opinion was inconsistent
with prior opinions, the Committee rule is that subsequent decisions overrule prior
opinions to the extent that a conflict exists.
The Committee has also suggested that an attorney may not agree to accept
stolen goods from his client as a fee in an attempt to discover their location and
disclose that information to the police. "It is not justifiable under any circumstances
for a lawyer to double-cross a client who employs him." ABA CoMM. ON PREFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, Informal Opinion No. 12.
21The Model Penal Code states that it is a misdemeanor if anyone "conceals
or removes any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity or
availability in [an official] proceeding or investigation." MODEL PFNAL CODE § 241.7
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
1'263 F. Supp. at 369. While no distinction has yet been drawn between the
lawyer's concealing evidence which is the fruit of the crime and that which is
merely an instrumentality of the crime, such a distinction might be drawn in determining whether the lawyer himself was guilty of any crime.
'See Ritz, Criminal Law and Procedure, Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 53
VA. L. REv. 1584 (1967).
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aids the client in concealing incriminating evidence in no way pre32
vents the attorney from becoming an accessory.
Ryder does not state what an attorney should do with evidence in
his possession incriminating his client. Assuming that Ryder should
have turned the evidence over to the court or the prosecutor, how
should the evidence be introduced at the trial without infringing upon
the client's privilege against self-incrimination? The Supreme Court
of Washington, in State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell,3 3 has provided what
is at present the only judicial attempt to reconcile the possible duty
of the attorney to submit incriminating evidence to the prosecutor
with the client's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
The decision also makes an attempt to resolve the Ryder conflict
between an attorney's duty to the court and the attorney-client privilege. Under this compromise solution the attorney within a reasonable
time after receipt of the evidence is required to turn it over to the
prosecutor. However, the prosecutor is not allowed to reveal the
scource of the evidence to the jury, and to do so would be reversible
error. The court observed that this procedure serves not only the public
interest, by allowing the prosecution to use the evidence, but also the
client's interest, by refusing to allow the prosecution to disclose the
source of the evidence. Assuming that the attorney has a duty to submit
incriminating evidence in his possession to the prosecution, the compromise solution in Sowers seems to be the only possible ethical alternative that the lawyer presently has in order both to preserve his
client's confidences and to fulfill his assumed duty to the court.
The court's approach in Ryder to the difficult ethical dilemma
imposed upon an attorney was essentially negative. The court gave
no guidelines and did not tell an attorney what he should do with
evidence incriminating his client. It seems that in deciding that what
Ryder did was wrong, the court raised more questions than it answered.3 4 The court's decision perhaps is buttressed by Ryder's taking
an affirmative and also illegal act to conceal the evidence. Because of
this, it is uncertain whether the same result would be reached by the
'Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339, 347 (1953). Of course, the
attorney may be guilty of unprofessional and unethical conduct even if his actions
do not constitute a crime. People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v...............
Attorney at Law, 88 Colo. 325, 295 P. 917 (1931).
164 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964).
3'For example, the court drew no distinction between evidence lost to the
world and evidence that may be found with diligence by the police. It might be
argued that it is less culpable for an attorney to advise a client not to reveal
incriminating evidence than it is for him to advise the client to destroy the
evidence.
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court if the attorney had been passive or if, instead of stolen money
and a sawed-off shotgun which is itself illegal, the incriminating evidence had consisted of a conventional weapon that had been used
for murder. Until the courts supply a definite solution to the attorney's
dilemma or at least a delineation of the outer bounds to which he
can go on behalf of his client, the problem will remain one of the
most difficult facing an attorney.
HUBERT H. YOUNG, JR.

